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UK governance: from overloading to freeloading
Richard Woodward
The UK's ongoing political turbulence has prompted a reprise of debates from the 1970s when many concluded the country was ungovernable. Then the most influential diagnosis conceptualised the UK's governance problem as one of 'overloading' caused by the electorate's excessive expectations. This article argues that these accounts overlooked another phenomena besieging UK governance during this period. This phenomena was freeloading, the withering of government capacity deriving from the ability of actors to enjoy the benefits of citizenship without altogether contributing to the cost. In the interim these problems have become endemic, not least because of the unspoken but discernible policy of successive governments to turn the UK into a tax haven. High profile scandals involving prominent individuals and corporations plus the failure to clampdown on them have reinforced the perception that the UK's political system is geared towards the rich and the powerful at the expense of the marginalised majority.
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The referendum result in favour of exiting the European Union (EU) and the inconclusive outcome of the 2017 General Election are the latest manifestations of a crisis of UK governance. Countless culprits have been implicated in the Brexit whodunit nevertheless the profound and widespread disaffection of many UK citizens with politics, politicians and political institutions is a chief suspect. The provenance of this alienation is contested but is frequently traced to the failure of the UK's political machinery to deliver on promises or to meet the electorate's expectations. In the last decade examples of this failure have been legion: the failure to deliver robust, balanced or inclusive economic growth, the failure to eliminate the budget deficit, the failure to meet homebuilding targets, the failure to control immigration, the failure to remedy the tribulations plaguing the National Health Service, the failure to address chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, and the failure to adequately equip, prepare and protect services personnel in and for combat zones.
This has prompted a reprise of the debates from the 1970s when an equivalent epoch of anaemic economic expansion, public policy failure, and mounting cynicism about politics led many to conclude the UK was ungovernable. 1 Training their stethoscopes on the heart of the UK body politic the country's political scientists broached various diagnoses, the most influential of which deemed the patient to be displaying symptoms of overload.
The overload thesis held that faith in the UK's political institutions was being eroded by a perennially expanding gulf between the electorate's expectations of government and the government's capacity to fulfil them. 2 Adherents to the overload thesis apportioned the bulk of the blame for the expectations gap to excessive voter demands. This article argues that in downplaying the issue of government capacity these accounts overlooked the onset of another phenomenon besieging UK governance in the 1970s. This phenomenon was freeloading, the withering of government capacity deriving from the ability of actors to enjoy many of the benefits of citizenship without altogether contributing to the cost. This dilemma has been aggravated in the interim by the acceleration of the unstated but discernable policy of successive administrations to transform the UK into a tax haven. As a tax haven, the UK permits rich individuals and corporations to profit handsomely from the public goods paid for out of general taxation whilst simultaneously supplying them with subterfuges that allow them to curtail their UK tax liabilities. Irrespective of citizen demands, tax avoidance and evasion deprives the UK government of the revenue necessary to discharge its responsibilities. By worsening inequality tax avoidance and evasion have also damaged the UK's democratic institutions. Many citizens perceive that the UK's political institutions and processes are geared towards the interests of a wealthy elite but are unsympathetic to the preferences of the majority. The seriousness of this predicament was finally acknowledged in the aftermath of the global financial crisis whereupon a crackdown on tax avoidance was pledged as part of the strategy to taper the UK's yawning budget deficit. Like previous endeavours however, the strength of the clampdown has been sapped by the hardwiring into the policymaking process of the interests favouring the perpetuation of Britain's tax haven status.
The 1970s -overloading and freeloading
In the decades after the Second World War, the orbit of UK government obligations bloomed as a consequence of interventions intended to promote social justice by mitigating the excesses of capitalism. Unfortunately this coincided with the growing intractability of problems not least, anticipating later debates about globalisation, because intensifying international interdependence put the scale and complexity of issues beyond the compass of individual governments. By the 1970s, these divergent tendencies had left a seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the electorate's expectations and the government's propensity to deliver them.
Despite reflecting on the UK government's deteriorating capacity the overload thesis concluded that the foremost quandary was a self-reinforcing escalation in the demands on government. regularly been derailed by a mercurial global economy, the intransigence of major economic partners or the necessity of complying with the welter of international rules and treaties by which the UK was bound.
The self-defeating nature of these remedies reflected the overload thesis' partial diagnosis. The excessive spending spawned by electoral demands unequivocably contributed to the UK's fiscal plight in the 1970s. Nevertheless this posture distracts from another aspect of these fiscal imbalances, namely the mounting difficulties of raising sufficient tax revenue.
Tax revenues are an essential component of the social contract whereby citizens forgo a portion of their income in return for the state supplying the physical, human and legal infrastructure needed to fortify freedom and the market economy. After 1945, the state's ability to underwrite this contract was bolstered by an international economic order predicated on ensuring finance was subject to national structures of democratic governance. Under the supervision of the Bretton Woods system of economic management, strict controls were maintained on short-term capital movements. These restrictions stifled attempts to move money overseas to shelter it from the privations of the tax inspector. By the 1970s however, the UK had acquiesced in developments that had emaciated these controls releasing an army of fiscal termites that were gnawing away at the ship of state's revenue raising power. . In short, UK governance was not simply encountering overloading from steepling demand it was simultaneously confronting freeloading by those whose wealth and business empires thrived upon the privileges and protections provided out of the public purse yet which could, through the use of tax havens, relinquish a substantial part of their duty to pay for them. annum. 8 Irrespective of the precise amount, the essential point is that rampant freeloading is ultimately incompatible with the government's commitment to the proper funding of public goods.
Tax haven UK
Incongruously some of the most notorious perpetrators of tax avoidance are also amongst the most prodigious consumers of public goods and recipients of government gratuity. The most egregious examples come from the banking sector. As the taxpayer was writing a blank cheque to bail out the financial system it was revealed that the big four high street banks were operating a network of 1,649 tax haven subsidiaries. Nearly 
Freeloading, inequality and democracy
Defenders of the status quo point out that corporations and rich individuals make sizable contributions to the UK exchequer. In 2015-16, 27.5% of the UK's income tax revenues were paid by the top 1% of earners whilst PwC's '100 group' of large companies ponied up 13.3% (£82.3bn) of government tax receipts. 9 That this is the case when, as the Google episode demonstrated, HNWI's and corporations are able to structure their financial affairs in a way that results in them paying tax at a fraction of the headline rate bears witness to the stratospheric levels of inequality in the contemporary UK. These inequalities, which freeloading has magnified, are feeding a sense of injustice that is poisoning the UK's democratic institutions.
Despite four decades of subservience to free-market nostrums the UK's tax take as a percentage of GDP has scarcely altered. To counteract the revenues haemorrhaged by a regime that countenances widespread tax abuse by the richest groups in British society, UK governments have opted to raise indirect taxes (such as value added tax and alcohol, tobacco and fuel duties). The Office for National Statistics notes that 'indirect taxes in the UK have been regressive throughout the period' since 1977. 10 What currently has the moniker of austerity is simply the compounding of a forty year long programme to square the freeloading circle by moderating spending and levying taxes that disproportionately distress the poorer segments of society. During this time, the UK went from being one of the most equal OECD countries to one of the most unequal. imperil the UK's democratic integrity by imparting 'an ingrained sense that the political process is rigged in favour of the rich, the powerful and the well-connected'. 13 Revelations that David Cameron had earned £31,500 from selling shares in a Panamanian based trust established by his late father served only to entrench this impression. Democratic governance requires that everyone has the opportunity for an equal say in collective decision making. This does not mean that everyone has equal sway but the outcome ought to reflect the most persuasive argument around which people could be mobilised rather than who has the most resources to set the political agenda.
The standing of the UK's governing institutions has been damaged in the eyes of many citizens by their inkling that they are insensitive to the inclinations of the majority and that outcomes are systematically slanted in favour of individuals and groups who, by virtue of their wealth, dominate the political process.
Since the financial crisis every UK government has given assurances that it will take action to subdue tax avoidance and evasion. As well as providing a lucrative source 
Conclusion
The UK's is suffering its worst crisis of governance since the 1970s. Just as in the 1970s, lacklustre economic growth, the failure to reflect citizen preferences, and ostensible impotence in the face of external developments are battering the legitimacy of the UK's political institutions. Whilst the conventional wisdom ascribes the governance crises of the 1970s and the present to overload this article has suggested that freeloading is also a common denominator. The ability of HNWIs and multinational corporations to legally avoid and illegally evade taxes while voraciously consuming the public goods for which those tax revenues pay has blown gaping holes in the UK's public finances. The economic inequality fostered by freeloading has also tarnished the democratic credentials of the UK's political institutions. Citizens feel disenfranchised by institutions that they judge, rightly or otherwise, are only responding to and lavishing exceptional treatment upon a wealthy minority. Alone serious and sustained action to quash freeloading is no panacea to the multifaceted challenges facing UK governance but it may at least tranquillise the grievances of those who feel that the rich increasingly have representation without taxation.
